This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory -including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games ofincomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with thebroad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any givenpoint. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theoryof noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimalchoice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices thatare based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to manyfields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in thestudy of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteenchapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games ofcomplete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incompleteinformation, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics atMIT.




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